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Abstract
This paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy
without federal commitment. Lack of commitment implies that tax policy is chosen prior to
federal transfers. The paper’s main result is that ex-post federal policy internalizes horizontal
fiscal externalities, insulating tax policy from capital mobility. Federal policy, however,
introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition. Specifically, ex-post
transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue-sharing system which may
render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare-deteriorating relative
to tax competition.
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Tax competition is a prevalent feature in the globalized economy, being of concern
to policy-makers and academics alike. Though following Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986), a lot of attention is conﬁned to tax competition among politically inde-
pendent states, in many cases however competing states are members of the
same ﬁscal union. For example in federal economies, such as Germany, U.S.A.
and Canada, taxing powers are partially assigned to lower level governments,
which allows them to compete for mobile capital (see Messere, 1998). Tax com-
petition in a ﬁscal union diﬀers from inter-union competition in at least two
respects. Lacking political and legal barriers, intra-union capital mobility tends
to be higher, magnifying concerns of tax competition. More importantly, member
states are linked by a common federal tax-transfer policy, which can be expected
to signiﬁcantly alter local incentives to engage in tax competition. However, the
hierarchical structure of the public sector is generally neglected in models of tax
competition, as pointed out in Oates (1994), though it may yield eﬃciency eﬀects
diﬀerent to those predicted by the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowski-type model and
used in policy debate.
This paper analyzes tax competition in a ﬁscal union with decentralized lead-
ership. In particular, the paper adopts a two-layer ﬁscal union in which the fed-
eral level redistributes public funds across states. Member states engage in tax
competition and receive transfers from the federal budget. Decentralized leader-
ship implies federal redistributive policy to be chosen after states have decided
upon tax policy. States thus anticipate the federal level responses to local tax
reforms. This strategic consideration, referred to as the soft-budget constraint
syndrome, is found to have signiﬁcance in real-world federal politics. Lower level
governments are frequently suspected of choosing public debt levels at a too high
level triggered by expectations of a federal bailout granted if they are rendered
insolvent. Some indications of a soft-budget constraint are provided e.g. for the
2U.S. in Poterba (1995) and for Germany in Rodden (2003). Drawing on case
studies of major federal economies, political competition or constitutional provi-
sions are identiﬁed as two potential candidates for why the federal government
reacts ex-post to policy changes in member states; see Rodden et al. (2003).
If ﬁscally-troubled states contain voters, which are politically decisive in federal
elections, federal politicians will favor bailing out these states. Alternatively, a
constitutionally-anchored “grandfathering” role for the federal government forces
the upper level to respond to unsound local ﬁscal policies by providing funds.1
Apart from constitutional and political factors, the sequence of moves may
also inherently originate from the type of ﬁscal policies both layers of government
pursue. Large scale tax reforms typically occur in larger time intervals. In con-
trast, transfers are set over a shorter time-horizon, implying that local tax policy
is implemented prior to transfers.
The present paper does not provide a rationale for a soft-budget constraint.
Instead, it focuses on its eﬃciency implications when confronted with ﬁscal com-
petition. The paper’s main ﬁnding is that soft budget constraints internalize
ﬁscal externalities. Anticipating that ex-post federal transfers tend to equate
public revenues in each state, the impact of tax rate changes on other states’
budget is internalized. However, federal transfers spread the social eﬀects of
marginal tax changes equally across all member states. Speciﬁcally, ex-post fed-
eral intervention allocates only a fraction of the social eﬀect to the state raising
the tax rate which, in turn, dilutes incentives to tax capital. In other words, de-
centralized commitment insulates states from harmful tax competition. Local tax
policy becomes independent of capital mobility. On the other hand, decentral-
ized commitment eﬀectively turns lump-sum redistribution into a revenue-sharing
system, rendering tax policy ineﬃcient for reasons other than tax competition.
1Such a “grandfathering” role is e.g. prescribed by the German constitution. Enforcing
this principle, the German supreme court has repeatedly instructed the federal government to
provide bailouts to needy states; see Rodden (2003).
3Welfare analysis reveals that federal policy may reduce welfare relative to tax
competition without federal intervention. Surprisingly, tax competition may be
welfare-superior in the presence of high capital mobility.
The paper contributes to the literature on tax-transfer policy in federal sys-
tems. In most parts of the literature, federal policy improves welfare. By im-
plementing a Pigouvian-type transfer scheme (Dahlby, 1996) or even by using
lump-sum transfers (Boadway and Keen, 1996, and Boadway et al., 1998), federal
policy oﬀsets ineﬃciencies in lower-level decision-making. A unifying assumption
underlying this body of literature is that the federal government can commit itself
towards lower-level governments (top-down commitment). The seminal paper by
Boadway and Flatters (1982) equally stands in this tradition. Federal transfers
are shown to prevent ﬁscally-induced migration by levelling out net public bene-
ﬁts accruing to households in diﬀerent regions. In accomplishing this, the federal
layer has to be able to commit to the equalization system.
The role of decentralized commitment in ﬁscal federalism has only been ad-
dressed recently. Silva and Caplan (1997) and Caplan et al. (2000) analyze federal
policy in the presence of transboundary externalities generated either by pollu-
tion or public consumption spill-overs. In these models, decentralized commit-
ment proves beneﬁcial since it allows externalities to be internalized. The results
conform to the traditional public ﬁnance view which favors federal intervention
in the presence of local ineﬃciencies. In contrast, ex-post federal policy may
also impose disincentives on lower-level governments (Wildasin, 1997). Antici-
pating a federal bailout, state governments are inclined to qualify for additional
funds by strategically under-providing local public goods.2 All these papers how-
ever abstract from issues of tax competition. Closest to this paper is Qian and
2Similarly, lacking federal commitment, federally-mandated equalization schemes tend to
reinforce rather than to oﬀset ﬁscally-induced migration incentives which undermines welfare
(Mitsui and Sato, 2001). Diﬀerent to this paper, Mitsui and Sato allow private agents to make
their decisions prior to policy formation. The assumption on intergovernmental commitment,
however, follows the traditional top-down commitment approach.
4Roland (1998). They investigate the merits of decentralized leadership and ﬁscal
competition in reducing bail-outs of private ﬁrms. Though similarly pointing to
an eﬃciency-enhancing role of decentralized commitment, they do not provide
a detailed analysis of the intergovernmental incentive structure in tax competi-
tion. The internalization eﬀect, inherent in ex-post transfer setting, makes no
appearance in their paper.
Finally, by proposing an internalization mechanism for horizontal ﬁscal exter-
nalities, the paper complements recent literature, demonstrating that household
mobility (Myers, 1990) and local provision of international public goods (Bjor-
vatn and Schjelderup, 2002) have the potential to internalize ﬁscal externalities.3
Common to these contributions, the present paper therefore suggests demand
for tax coordination to be less pronounced than indicated by the standard tax
competition model.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the set-up of the basic
model. Section 3 analyzes tax policy if neither level of government can commit.
The eﬀects of decentralized commitment are presented in Section 4 followed by
a welfare analysis in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to extensions of the basic
model. A summary and some concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 7. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with n ¸ 2 identical states each consisting of a representa-
tive household and a representative ﬁrm. The former derives utility from private
and public consumption denoted by c and g, respectively. Preferences are given
3Transfers are also present in Myers. Regions may voluntarily transfer resources interre-
gionally in order to “buy” the preferred population size therein. He does not, however, employ
an institutionalized transfer system, nor does he model incentives in hierarchical governments
(by assuming a one-layer government). The internalization mechanism based on decentralized
commitment, proposed in this paper, is thus diﬀerent to the one suggested by Myers. In fact,
household mobility and ex-post transfers complement each other as shown in Section 6.
5by
u = c + b(g);




0(g) = 0; and lim
g!0
b
0(g) = 1: (A)
The budget constraint reads
c = I + r˜ k;
where I is income generated by a ﬁxed factor (say land) owned by the represen-
tative household, r is the interest rate, and ˜ k denotes the capital endowment of
each household normalized at unity.
Each state produces a single good using the neoclassical production technol-
ogy f(k), which exhibits constant returns to scale.5 Output can be used on a
one-to-one basis for private and public consumption. The representative ﬁrm in
each state maximizes proﬁts ¼ = f(k)¡(r+t)k with t as the source-based capital
tax rate. Proﬁt maximizing input choices follow from the ﬁrst-order condition
f0(k) = r + t, which deﬁnes capital demand as a function of the rental price
of capital, k = k(r + t). The assumption of constant returns to scale implies
I = f(k) ¡ f0(k)k.
f0(k) = r + t and the capital market clearing condition
Pn
i=1 ki = n˜ k charac-




















where the responses are evaluated at ki = k¡i.6 Optimizing ﬁrm behavior leads to
indirect utility vi(ti;t￿i;gi).7 Invoking the envelope theorem and setting ki = k¡i
4The superscript 0 (00) denotes a function’s ﬁrst (second) derivative.
5More precisely, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to
both inputs: capital and the ﬁxed factor.
6The superscript ¡i denotes a state other than state i.











The public sector is modelled as a two-layer federal system. State governments
tax capital on a source-basis at rates fti > 0gi=1;:::;n. Tax revenues, ftikigi=1;:::;n,
are recycled by providing a local public good, fgi = tiki+si > 0gi=1;:::;n. The fed-
eral government provides lump-sum grants which are ﬁnanced by contributions
made by member states of the union. fsigi=1;:::;n denotes the net-of contribu-
tion payment each state receives (or pays if negative). Both levels of government
are assumed to be benevolent. State governments maximize utility of the rep-




Since regions are identical, attention is conﬁned to symmetric equilibria, sub-
sequently.8
3 Nash-Behavior
This section characterizes public policy if no government can commit to its pol-
icy.9 The outcome will later on be contrasted with the outcome prevailing under
decentralized commitment. The decision sequence of the game is the following
(Figure 1):10
8The stark symmetry assumption is invoked to exclusively focus on the incentive eﬀects of
ex-post lump-sum transfers on tax setting. With e.g. regional asymmetries in endowments or
preferences, which typically create demand for federal transfers, the incentive (substitution)
eﬀects would be accompanied by redistributive (income) eﬀects. The latter would originate
from positive or negative equilibrium transfer payments.
9In line with top-down approach, federal commitment might be considered as a more ap-
propriate benchmark. Note, in the current setting, both scenarios yield the same equilibrium
allocation. Since transfer payments are zero in a symmetric equilibrium, the federal government
cannot strategically inﬂuence state tax setting via lump-sum transfers. Therefore, any federal
commitment to transfers is neutral.
10For simplicity, we suppress the ﬁnal stage of the game at which production takes place,
public goods are provided and are consumed together with the private good.
7- s s
governments
move simultaneously ﬁrms move
Figure 1: Sequence of moves: non-commitment.
First Stage: Both levels of government choose their policy instruments fti;sigi=1;:::;n
simultaneously. They behave as Nash competitors, i.e. each government takes
policy choices of other governments as given. However, they account for the eﬀect
on private agents’ decisions.
Second Stage: At the second stage of the game, private agents decide on
fkigi=1;:::;n for given policy instruments.
The game is solved by backward induction to identify a subgame-perfect equi-
librium. Subsequently, attention is conﬁned to symmetric equilibria, i.e. ki = ˜ k.11
The behavior of private agents is suﬃciently described by Eq. (2) which allows
an immediate analysis of public sector behavior.
State Government State government i sets its capital tax rate, ti, for given
(si;t￿i) to maximize the indirect utility of the representative household subject





















11The stark assumption of symmetry is introduced to focus on the incentive eﬀects of ex-
post lump-sum transfers on tax setting. With e.g. regional asymmetries in endowments or
preferences, which typically create demand for federal transfers, the incentive (substitution)
eﬀects are accompanied by redistributive (income) eﬀects. The latter originate from actual
positive or negative equilibrium transfer payments.
8Eq. (3) exhibits the well-known feature of capital tax competition: underprovision
of local public goods. Given a perceived outﬂow of capital in response to a rise
in capital taxation, captured by ²ki;ti < 0, the state’s marginal cost of public
funds [r.h.s. of Eq. (3); henceforth SMCPF] exceeds the social marginal rate
of transformation equal to unity. At an optimum the beneﬁts of taxation, bi
g,
are equated to SMCPF, yielding bi
g > 1. Alternatively, tax competition can be
viewed as imposing a horizontal ﬁscal externality on other states’ tax revenues
(Wildasin, 1989). The outﬂow of capital enlarges the tax base in neighboring
states which constitutes a positive eﬀect not accounted for by the tax-raising
state. This failure implies ineﬃciently low tax rates.
























The federal government sets transfers so as to equalize the marginal beneﬁt of
public consumption across states. Following concavity of b(¢), any interstate
diﬀerence in the marginal valuation of public consumption is equalized by trans-
ferring funds from the low-valuation to the high-valuation state. The ﬁrst-order
condition (4) and the federal budget constraint implicitly deﬁne the set of reac-
tion functions fsi = 'i(ti;t￿i)gi=1;:::;n.
Since equilibrium transfers are zero, the subgame perfect equilibrium is equiv-
alent to the Nash-equilibrium prevailing in a game between non-federated states
moving simultaneously. The benchmark allocation thus coincides with the stan-
dard tax competition equilibrium - a result which subsequently allows for a mean-
ingful welfare comparison.





Figure 2: Sequence of moves: decentralized commitment.
4 Decentralized Commitment
In this section, states are assumed to act as Stackelberg leaders. Therefore, the
sequence of decisions becomes (Figure 2):12
First Stage: States simultaneously select their capital tax rates ftigi=1;:::;n
taking the reaction of the federal government and private agents into account.
That is, state governments behave as Nash-competitors towards each other.
Second Stage: The federal level determines its policy variables fsigi=1;:::;n for
given states’ policy choices. It anticipates the reaction of private agents.
Third Stage: Private agents choose fkigi=1;:::;n for given policy at the federal
and state level.
To characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium, the game is solved by back-
wards induction. Given that private agents’ decisions are suﬃciently represented
by Eq. (2), we can immediately turn to the second stage of the game.
Federal Government In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, transfer policy fol-
lows from the federal best-response functions fsi = 'i(ti;t￿i)gi=1;:::;n. To derive
the federal best-reply to a change in state i’s policy, the ﬁrst-order condition (4)
and the federal budget constraint,
Pn
i=1 si = 0, is diﬀerentiated. For the partic-
12Again, the ﬁnal stage of the game is suppressed; see footnote 10.













The best-reply of federal transfers si separates into two eﬀects. Firstly, the trans-
fer scheme spreads the cross-budget eﬀects of state i’s tax policy evenly across
all states, as captured by the ﬁrst term in Eq. (5). Secondly, the transfer scheme
“taxes” state i’s marginal tax revenues, @
@tigi = @
@titiki, at a rate n¡1
n , where the
“proceeds” are shared equally among the remaining n ¡ 1 states. Both eﬀects
ensure ex-post equalization of public funds as called for by the federal ﬁrst-order
condition (4).
State Government State government i solves
maxti vi(ti;t￿i;gi)
s.t. gi = tiki + si and si = 'i(ti;t￿i):




g = n: (6)
Given n > 1, local public goods are underprovided in a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. To rationalize why marginal beneﬁts are equated to the size of the ﬁscal
union, it is instructive to analyze the eﬀect of a rise in ti on public funds available
























where the last equality is derived by using Eq. (1) and evaluating the expression
at a symmetric equilibrium.
11The total eﬀect decomposes in an own tax revenue eﬀect, @
@tigi = @
@titiki,
and a transfer eﬀect, @
@tisi. Ignoring the term 1
n for the moment, ex-post federal
intervention induces the social eﬀects, following a marginal rise in ti, to be pooled
in state i’s budget as captured by the bracketed term in Eq. (7). Federal transfers
thus internalize horizontal ﬁscal externalities which eliminates tax competition.
Consequently, from the perspective of each state government, the source-based
capital tax, becomes a lump-sum tax which, taken in isolation, improves the
eﬃciency of public policy.
However, with symmetric states the federal transfer scheme allocates only a
fraction 1
n of ki to state i’s budget so as to equalize public funds across states.
Ex-post transfers therefore prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue-sharing
system which dilutes incentives to tax capital. Raising one unit of tax revenues
requires private consumption to be reduced by n units due to revenue sharing.
The state marginal cost of public funds becomes equal to n > 1, as shown in op-
timality condition (6), indicating underprovision of public goods in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 summarizes the ﬁndings.
Proposition 1: Decentralized commitment internalizes horizontal ﬁscal ex-
ternalities. However, interstate lump-sum redistribution eﬀectively becomes an
interstate revenue-sharing system rendering public good provision ineﬃcient.
5 Comparing Welfare
Given symmetric states, welfare diﬀerences can be inferred from the tax rate
diﬀerential tdc ¡ tnc where tdc and tnc denote equilibrium tax rates under decen-
tralized and non-commitment, respectively. Lemma 1 and 2 compare tax rates
chosen by union-member states which are small and large, respectively relative
to the rest of the ﬁscal union.
12Lemma 1: (Small member states) If n ! 1, tnc > tdc.
The dominance of the revenue sharing eﬀect can best be rationalized by com-
paring the marginal cost of taxation under both regimes. Under decentralized
commitment, the marginal cost of public funds, n, converges to inﬁnity. The
revenue sharing system allocates only a negligible fraction of the social marginal
eﬀect of a tax rise to the respective state budget. With tax competition, a ris-
ing n magniﬁes the perceived response of the tax base to a rise in the tax rate,
thereby increasing the marginal cost of taxation as well. However, the eﬀect
proves to be less pronounced. In fact, following Eqs. (1) and (3) SMCPF be-
comes (1 + tnc=f00(1))
¡1 < 1 which leaves states with stronger taxing incentives
in tax competition relative to ex-post federal intervention.
For notational simplicity, ° := ¡f00(1)¡1, subsequently. ° has a ready eco-
nomic interpretation. Since concavity of the production function is inversely
related to the tax base elasticity, ° provides a measure for the intensity of tax
competition based on production technology.13
Lemma 2: (Large member states) Let the size of the ﬁscal union be




nc () ° T °
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Contrary to tdc, the tax rate under non-commitment tnc is inﬂuenced by n as
well as by °. Fixing n, if tax competition becomes ﬁerce enough as speciﬁed by
13Note, a higher degree of concavity requires less capital outﬂow in response to a tax rise to
restore the arbitrage condition f0(ki)¡ti = f0(k¡i)¡t¡i. A second measure for tax competition







of n diminish tax burden shifting onto capital owners by reducing interest rates which expose
states to more competition. Both measures prove critical in the welfare comparison.
13° > °¤(n), tnc is suﬃciently downward-pressured such that decentralized com-
mitment yields higher welfare despite the presence of the revenue-sharing eﬀect.
The example b(g) = lng is used to illustrate °¤ as a function of n. In this case,
the threshold level, °¤, takes the particularly simple form °¤ = n for n ¸ 2.14
Figure 3 depicts parameter combinations for which tdc ¡ tnc becomes positive or
negative. A noteworthy observation is that contrary to tax competition consider-
ations a positive relation between the magnitude of tdc¡tnc and j²ij does not hold
per se. Comparative statics in ° indeed conﬁrm this intuition. However, ﬁxing
°, an increase in the size of the ﬁscal union n tends to render tdc ¡ tnc negative
though j²ij magniﬁes.
In order to plausibly assess the scope for tax competition (non-commitment)
to yield higher welfare, we employ empirical estimates of demand elasticities as
reported in Chirinko et al. (1999). A ﬁrm-level demand elasticity of ¡0:25, which
provides an upper bound (in absolute value) for the tax base elasticity ²i,15 gives
1 < 1
1+²i < 2. Following Eqs. (3) and (6), the marginal cost of public funds under
tax competition appears to be less attenuated for n ¸ 2, indicating tdc ¡tnc < 0.
The results of Lemma 1 and 2 are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: If member states are small, the eﬀect of revenue-sharing un-
der decentralized commitment unambiguously implies lower welfare relative to tax
competition. With large member states, however, a ex-post transfer setting may
prove to be welfare-superior.
14With this speciﬁcation, tax rates amount to tdc = 1
n and tnc = n
n+°(n¡1). Setting tdc = tnc
the threshold level °¤ becomes equal to n for n > 1. In the limiting case, n ! 1 tdc ! 0 and,
given l’Hˆ opital’s rule, tnc ! 1
1+° > 0 for ° < 1. Therefore, tnc > tdc as predicted by Lemma
1.
15To see this, note that the ﬁrm-level capital demand response to a higher tax rate reads
1
f00(ki). The regional capital demand response (Eq.(1)) diﬀers from the ﬁrm-level one by the
term n¡1


















Figure 3: Welfare comparison for b(g) = lng.
The following lemma provides some more intuition for Proposition 2.












The result has a straightforward explanation. Incentives to tax capital are
strengthened if a higher capital tax rate translates into more transfers. As shown
in Smart (1998), transfer competition (i.e. @
@tisi > 0) reduces welfare when not
being complemented by tax competition. Governments are inclined to choose
an ineﬃciently high tax rate in an attempt to attract transfers. Here, however,
allowing for transfer competition proves beneﬁcial since the prospects of higher
transfers raises tax rates from an ineﬃciently low level.16
Additionally, Lemma 3 relates the paper to the literature on vertical ﬁscal
externalities. Diﬀerentiating the sum of indirect utility except that of state i
16See Qian and Roland (1998) and K¨ othenb¨ urger (2002) for a similar beneﬁcial role of transfer
competition.


























Term (a) captures the positive horizontal ﬁscal externality a marginal tax increase
imposes on other state budgets. It is this eﬀect which renders tax competition
ineﬃcient. Ex-post federal intervention allows for a second type of ﬁscal exter-
nality represented by the term (b). A change in state i’s tax policy alters public
transfers allocated to other states which constitutes a vertical ﬁscal externality.
Implied by symmetry and the federal budget constraint, horizontal ﬁscal exter-




inducing states to select tdc > tnc.17
The nature of the vertical ﬁscal externality diﬀers from those analyzed in
previous literature.18 Therein either federal tax setting exerts an externality on
lower-level governments’ budgets (“top-down” vertical ﬁscal externality) or vice
versa (“bottom-up” vertical ﬁscal externality). With decentralized commitment,
state tax policy aﬀects other state budgets via federal policy changes. Contin-
uing the analogy, this eﬀect constitutes a “bottom-up-top-down” vertical ﬁscal
externality.
6 Extensions
So far, the analysis has been conﬁned to the basic Zodrow-Mieszkowski tax com-
petition model extended by a federal level which allowed for a clear presentation
of the results. Subsequently, the baseline model is extended in various ways to
explore the robustness of the internalization and revenue-sharing eﬀect of ﬁscal
transfers.
17By Eq. (6), the horizontal ﬁscal externality always dominates the possibly counteracting
vertical ﬁscal externality, precluding the possibility of overtaxation of capital as found in Keen
and Kotsogiannis (2002).
18See Keen (1998) for a comprehensive overview of the literature on vertical ﬁscal externality.
166.1 Non-Union Member States
Let m > n denote the total number of symmetric states in the economy, n of
which form a ﬁscal union. If capital is allocated equally across all states, capital
supply responses to a change in ti are identical to Eq. (1) except that n has to
be replaced by m. In the benchmark case of non-commitment, tax rates are still
downward-distorted by capital mobility as shown in Eq. (3).
To analyze the allocative eﬀects of decentralized commitment, consider a rise
in the tax rate of state i, which is a member of the ﬁscal union. The transfer
response continues to be captured by Eq. (5). In a symmetric equilibrium, the





























where the last equation follows from the capital market clearing condition. Ex-
post federal intervention internalizes horizontal ﬁscal externalities operating among
member states of the ﬁscal union. Each member state perceives an outﬂow of












Contrary to the baseline model in Section 4, tax policy is not completely insulated
from capital mobility. Using Eq. (1), @
@ti¯ ki = m¡n
m
1
f00(ki) < 0. The response is lower
than in the benchmark case (for n > 1) reﬂecting the absorption of intra-union
capital mobility by ex-post transfers. Moreover, it equals the capital supply
response as perceived by the upper level. Intuitively, each member state accesses
the international capital market with the market power of the whole ﬁscal union.
The reduced overestimation of the marginal cost of public funds points to higher
19The superscript ¡i (¡i¤) denotes a state other than state i being (not being) a member of
the ﬁscal union state i belongs to.
17equilibrium tax rates relative to the benchmark. However, the partial eﬀect is
counteracted by ex-post federal equalization of tax revenues as captured by n in
Eq. (10).
6.2 Distortionary Labor Taxation
Let the second factor of production be labor, being endogenously supplied by each
household and decreasing in the labor tax rate, ¿, levied by the state government.
In the benchmark case the labor tax rate turns out to be downward-distorted by
capital mobility (see Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) for a detailed analysis). A
rise in ¿ reduces labor supply which - given complementarity between labor and
capital in production - lowers the net-of-tax rate of return on capital below the
level prevailing in other states. The perceived outﬂow of capital in addition to
the induced labor-leisure distortion implies labor taxes to be set at a third-best
level .
Ex-post federal redistribution has the virtue of insulating labor tax policy
from intra-union capital mobility which, other things being equal, pressures labor
tax rates upwards to the second-best level. Perceiving that only a fraction 1
n of
additional labor tax revenues accrues to the state’s own budget, the labor tax
rate will eventually be set below the second-best level.
6.3 Household Mobility
As documented in recent literature household mobility tends to improve eﬃciency
of decentralized public ﬁnance (Myers, 1990).20 By responding to interregional
utility diﬀerentials, mobile households create a welfare linkage between regions
which at least partly internalize interregional externalities.
In the limit of perfect household mobility migration responses render symmet-
ric capital tax competition eﬃcient (Wellisch, 2000, p. 111). Since any utility dif-
ferential between regions is arbitraged away, each regional government implicitly
20See Wellisch (2000) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
18maximizes utility of all regions in the federation which aligns regional incentives
to social incentives. Perfect incentive equivalence however fails to hold in the
more realistic case of imperfect household mobility. In this case decentralized
commitment complements imperfect household mobility in absorbing the eﬀect
of resource mobility on the eﬃciency of the public sector. Equal to the base-
line model, levelling out interregional public consumption diﬀerences by ex-post
transfer setting eliminates ﬁscal externalities in a symmetric equilibrium. Again,
the resource allocation between the private and public sector becomes ineﬃcient,
however for reasons diﬀerent to tax competition.
7 Conclusion
The paper shows that decentralized commitment fundamentally changes the na-
ture of capital tax competition in a ﬁscal union. With capital tax rates set prior
to federal transfers, horizontal ﬁscal externalities among members of the ﬁscal
union are internalized. Ex-post federal intervention thus has the merit of neu-
tralizing the impact of capital mobility on local tax policy. However, ex-post
federal transfer policy eﬀectively becomes an interstate revenue-sharing mecha-
nism which implies that equilibrium tax rates are set at an ineﬃciently low level.
Welfare analysis reveals that tax competition may appear to be the preferred
federal governance structure.
The literature does not provide econometric guidance on which type of vertical
commitment (i.e. (de)centralized commitment or even non-commitment) is more
descriptive in federal economies. The only paper addressing the issue of commit-
ment so far is Hayashi and Boadway (2001). Analyzing business tax setting in
Canada, they ﬁnd inconclusive results as to whether the federal government acts
as a Stackelberg leader or Nash-competitor towards provinces. Given the lack
of empirical evidence, it is however at least instructive to contrast the diﬀerent
scenarios; especially if the policy outcomes fundamentally deviate as shown in
19the paper.
In particular, three diverging implications are noteworthy. Firstly, the more
pronounced capital mobility among union member states21, originating e.g. from
the creation of a single capital market in a union, does not necessarily imply
ﬁercer tax competition as typically conjectured in the literature (e.g. Begg et al.,
1993). Indeed, with ex-post transfers the potential advantage of a higher capital
mobility can be reaped without suﬀering the costs associated with a more severe
underprovision of public services.22
Secondly, even if potentially welfare-enhancing, tax coordination among in-
dependent states appears to be diﬃcult to achieve in practice. Not only the
potential non-veriﬁability of eﬀective tax rates, but also the lack of institution
enforcing tax coordination agreements between independent states partly explain
this failure.23 The federal level may instead implicitly induce state governments
to choose capital tax rates in a coordinated way by making contingent transfers
(e.g. Wildasin, 1989, and Dahlby, 1996). The paper casts doubt on this fre-
quently encountered argument. In fact, federal intervention, when coupled with
commitment problems, may render unfettered tax competition welfare-superior.
The paper thus underlines the need for a careful evaluation of second-best federal
institutions for implementing tax coordination.24
Finally, tax and yardstick competition are argued to lie at the root of the em-
pirically validated complementarity between local capital tax rates.25 Following
the present paper, a third channel of interaction proves equally capable of explain-
21See e.g. Helliwell and McKitrick (1999) for an empirical analysis.
22A similar argument is derived in Persson and Tabellini (1992) by invoking political economy
mechanisms. In particular, strategic delegation of politicians partly neutralizes the impact of
economic integration on capital tax rates.
23Non-veriﬁability implies that any tax coordination agreement cannot be conditioned on
eﬀective tax rates. Only a subset of instruments, ultimately inﬂuencing eﬀective tax rates, can
be part of such an agreement (e.g. statutory tax rates). Facing this incompleteness, partial
coordination may result in even ﬁercer tax competition via tax instruments still under local
discretion; see Cr´ emer and Gahvari (2000).
24See Kehoe (1989), Janeba (2000), and Perroni and Scharf (2001) for a related cautious
argument on the desirability of federally-mediated policy coordination.
25See Brueckner (2001) for a survey.
20ing the interaction. More precisely, equilibrium tax interaction may exclusively
be generated by federal transfers even in the presence of capital mobility. Dis-
entangling the various sources of strategic interaction may therefore be a fruitful
avenue for future empirical research, shedding more light on the relevance of the
tax competition argument relative to competing explanations.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Comparing Eqs. (3) and (6) reveals that tdc ¡ tnc T 0 iﬀ ¡n¡1
n T ²ijti=tnc. For
n ! 1, the term ¡n¡1
n approaches ¡1 giving tdc¡tnc T 0 iﬀ ¡1 T ²ijti=tnc. The
rest of the proof proceeds by ﬁrst proving the existence of tnc. In a second step,
it is shown that at the non-commitment equilibrium, ¡1 < ²ijti=tnc.
First step: Inserting Eq. (1) into the right-hand-side of Eq. (3) and evaluating
the term at ˜ k = 1 shows that SMCPF is equal to (1 + t=f00(1))
¡1 for n ! 1.
Note, if t " ¡f00(1), SMCPF ! 1 and if t ! 0, SMCPF ! 1. Given monotonic-
ity and continuity of SMCPF and condition (A) imposed on b0(g), there always
exists a unique tax rate tnc 2 (0;¡f00(1)) satisfying Eq. (3).
Second step: Following Eq. (1) and ˜ k = 1, ²ijti=tnc = tncf00(1)¡1 for n ! 1.
As shown in the ﬁrst step, tnc < ¡f00(1) yielding ²ijti=tnc > ¡1, which completes
the proof.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let the size of the ﬁscal union be given by n 2 (1;1). Eq. (6) uniquely de-
ﬁnes tdc as a function of n. Now, insert tdc (n) in ²i evaluated at a symmetric
equilibrium. Using (1), ²i can now be written as a function of n and °, i.e.
˜ ²(n;°) := ²i ¡
tdc(n);n;°
¢
. Note, if ° ! 0, ˜ ²(n;°) goes to 0. Furthermore, if
° ! 1, ˜ ²(n;°) converges to ¡1 and - given continuity of ˜ ²(n;°) - the inter-
mediate value theorem guarantees a value of ˜ ° which yields ˜ ²(n; ˜ °) = ¡1. At
an interior solution, we thus have ° 2 [0; ˜ °). Again, given by the intermediate
value theorem, there exists a value °¤ 2 [0; ˜ °) which satisﬁes ˜ ²(n;°¤) = ¡n¡1
n .
Following Eqs. (3) and (6), tdc ¡ tnc T 0 iﬀ ¡n¡1
n T ²ijti=tnc. Therefore, tdc and
21tnc coincide for parameter values n and °¤, proving the ﬁrst assertion in Lemma
2.







Starting from n and °¤, the tax diﬀerential tdc¡tnc increases as ° increases which
gives condition (8).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Given Eqs. (3) and (6), tdc ¡ tnc T 0 iﬀ ¡n¡1
n T ²ijti=tnc. Evaluating Eq. (5) in a
symmetric equilibrium, inserting Eq. (1), and using the aforementioned condition,
proves Lemma 3.
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